Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons is an analogy that shows how 2 individuals driven by self-interest can end up destroying the resource 3 upon which they all depend. The proposed solutions for humans rely on 4 highly advanced skills such as negotiation, which raises the question 5 of how non-human organisms manage to resolve similar tragedies. In recent 6 years, this question has promoted evolutionary biologists to apply the 7 tragedy of the commons to a wide range of biological systems. Here we 8 provide tools to categorize different types of tragedies, and review 9 different mechanisms that can resolve conflicts that could otherwise end 10 in tragedy, including kinship, policing and diminishing returns. A 11 central open question, however, is how often biological systems are able 12 to resolve these scenarios rather than drive themselves extinct through 13 individual-level selection favouring self-interested behaviours. 14 15
land to graze everyone shares the cost, which comes from reducing the amount of 1 forage per cattle. If the herders are driven only by economic self-interest, they will 2 each realize that it is to their advantage to always add another animal to the common: 3 they sacrifice the good of the group (by forgoing sustainable use of the resource) for 4 their own selfish gain. Thus, herders will continue to add animals, eventually leading 5 to a "tragedy" where the pasture is destroyed by overgrazing [1] . 6
The difficulties inherent in protecting shared common resources, such as marine 7 stocks or clean air, are well known: while everyone benefits from an intact resource, 8 there is an individual-level temptation to cheat (e.g. to overexploit or pollute) because 9 cheating brings economic advantages to the individual while costs are distributed 10 among all individuals (see box 1). The lesson drawn from these studies is that solving 11 the dilemma often requires negotiation and sanctions on disobedient individuals. This 12 changes the payoffs, so that group-beneficial behaviour also becomes optimal for the 13 individual: an example would be imposing heavier taxes on polluting industries. 14 Hardin's own main solution to the tragedy of the commons was state governance and 15 privatization of the resource in question [1] ; in general, social norms as well as 16 individual morality have been considered good candidates for preventing 17 overexploitation of common resources. 18
Despite citing Lack's work on population regulation [3] to contrast population 19 regulation in birds with human population growth, Hardin did not venture to extend 20 his analogy to the problems of evolutionary ecology. However, if the tragedy can only 21 be avoided when higher-level incentives are invoked, as in the case of legal 22 incentives, this raises the question of how non-human organisms can avoid 23 overexploiting the resources they depend on. After the group selection debate of the 24 much needed oxygen [24] . As a side effect, polymer production by these tall piles of 1 cells suffocate non-polymer producing neighbours [24] . This is analogous to plant 2 competition for light, in that vertical growth provides a competitive advantage over 3 conspecifics, but comes at an overall cost to the group: individuals which produce 4 polymers create a competitive environment which will lower overall group 5 productivity. 6
Bacteriocin production in bacteria may likewise be seen as a tragedy of the commons. 7
The production of bacteriocins kill other conspecifics, as well as the focal individual 8 [25, 26] , but can benefit immune clonemates at the expense of susceptible, unrelated 9 bacteria, which are the target of the bacteriocins. Bacteriocin production creates a 10 situation where group productivity is reduced: while the individuals which produce 11 the antibiotics stand to benefit, the group would do better if everyone restrained from 12 producing bacteriocins. In this case, the social good is living in a bacteriocin-free 13 environment, and this good is destroyed when all individuals produce bacteriocins. It 14 is worthwhile noting that bacteriocin production is also susceptible to a type 2a social 15 goods tragedy, in that it may be advantageous for immune bacteria to cheat by 16 refraining from producing bacteriocins themselves [e.g. 27] . Indeed, the same 17 behaviour may often include conflict over multiple types of resources and hence 18 different types of tragedy. 19
Collapsing and component tragedies 20
The tragedy of the commons is commonly defined as a situation in which the selfish 21 actions of individuals result in the complete collapse of the resource over which they 22 are competing [1] . It is therefore important to add another layer of classification: how 23 the tragedy affects the productivity of a group (note that the term 'group' should be 24 interpreted widely, extending to populations or species, depending on the scale and 1 consequences of interactions between individuals). 2
As such, we define a "collapsing" tragedy as a situation where selfish individual 3 behaviour results in the entire resource vanishing (figure 1). For example, if the 4 currency is a social good formed by cooperation, collapse would mean that the group 5 loses the cooperative behaviour in question, and the social good ceases to exist. This 6 type of tragedy can lead to the extinction of the whole group, if the resource or the 7 social good was essential for its survival. An example of a "collapsing" tragedy is 8 worker reproduction in the Cape honey bee, where workers cease to help the colony 9 and instead invest in their own selfish reproduction, leading to very few individuals 10 becoming workers, and in turn, colony collapse [28] . 11
Losing the resource completely is the most obvious form of a tragedy of the 12 commons, but empirically it is difficult to observe resources that have already 13 collapsed. A slightly weaker form of the tragedy of the commons occurs when the 14 resource has been depleted, but not to the extent that it disappears completely. We 15 define such a tragedy as the "component" tragedy, the word "component" being 16 borrowed from the Allee effect literature [29] . A component Allee effect is a density-17 dependent process which reduces some component of fitness at low densities, and it 18 differs from demographic Allee effects in that the component Allee effect does not 19 necessarily diminish population growth, because other fitness components might 20 compensate. Component tragedies similarly result in a lower average fitness for the 21 group, as a result of selfish competition, but the group is still able to persist on the 22 resource in question (type 1 in Table 2 ) or benefit to some degree from the social 23 good (type 2 and 2b in table 2): the resource has not disappeared completely. Figure 1  24 shows the conceptual difference between a component and a collapsing tragedy of the 1
commons. 2
Component tragedies are likely to be very common (Table 1) , as they simply reflect 3 the argument from the levels of selection debate that individual-level selection is 4 usually stronger than higher-level selection. One could argue that a too broad 5 definition renders a term less useful -indeed, whenever there is conflict between 6 individual and common good, the latter is expected to be sacrificed to some extent at 7 least. However, not all competitive scenarios lead to component tragedies (see Box 2). 8 Therefore, there is no tautology. Instead, identifying whether and under which 9 conditions such tragedies occur should be useful. Likewise, it is important to 10 differentiate between component and collapsing tragedies. that extent of a given tragedy could be measured as the deviation in group success 21 from that of a group in which individuals share the same interests and behave in a way 22 that is optimal for the group. In some cases, it can also be useful to quantify the 23 opposite deviation, i.e. how far away is the group resource from complete collapse 1 [30] . 2
Resolving the tragedy 3
One of the main advantages of using the tragedy of the commons as an analogy in 4 evolutionary biology is that it forces us to ask the question why a tragedy of the 5 commons is not observed in a particular scenario [Table 1, 14, 30] . The fact that we 6 can observe significant amounts of cooperation despite the selfish interests of free 7 riders and cheaters raises the question of why component tragedies do not always 8 become collapsing tragedies, or why individuals in some cases cooperate so diligently 9 that even component tragedies are absent. The latter can be defined as a 'resolved 10 conflict' and is illustrated by cases of no significant colony-level costs of conflicts in 11 insect colonies [30] . 12
Restraining may be individually optimal 13
By definition, a tragedy of the commons will not arise if there are direct benefits to 14 restraint. Therefore, apparently 'resolved' tragedies may, upon examination, turn out 15 not to be tragedies in the first place. [35] . Population structure helps to align the interests of 6 the individual with the interests of the group. This means that any reduction in group 7 productivity which results from individual-level selfishness will come at an inclusive 8 fitness cost to the focal individual, and hence over-exploiting a common resource will 9 be less beneficial. As a result, groups of related individuals which show restraint in 10 competition over a common resource will be favoured over groups in which 11 individual-level competition results in a tragedy of the commons. 12
Coercion and punishment 13
Coercion and punishment are among the most widely studied mechanisms for 14 avoiding a tragedy of the commons, both in the evolutionary literature [6, [36] [37] [38] as 15 well as in human sociobiology studies [e.g. 38] . These factors play a part in private 16 ownership of the resource (e.g. attempts to steal are punished) as well as 17 governmental control of resources [1] through the manipulation of payoffs (e. g. via 18 taxes). Coercion (where individuals manipulate and put pressure on others) has been 19 shown to be a potential force in altering the payoffs in animal societies [6] . Perhaps 20 the most sophisticated examples can be found in social insect colonies, where 21 "policing" individuals ensure that colony workers act to the benefit of the whole 22 colony and do not reproduce for their own selfish interest: worker-laid eggs are 23 regularly eaten by other workers [39] . 24
While punishment can undoubtedly stabilize cooperation, for example between 1 legumes and their rhizome bacteria [40] , it is interesting to note that such behaviour 2 also can be subject to a social goods tragedy of the commons in itself. We face a 3 second-order free-rider problem: when punishment is costly to the punisher, there is 4 an individual-level temptation not to punish cheaters [e.g. 41]. As such, higher-order 5 punishment (punishing individuals who do not punish) may be needed in such a 6 scenario [41] . But because this raises the same free-rider question at a higher level 7 (i.e. why not save energy by not punishing those who do not punish), punishment is 8 undoubtedly easier to explain in cases in which the punishing act itself is not costly, 9 such as egg-eating by policing workers, or when punishers receive more cooperation 10 from others [42] . 11
Diminishing returns and ecological feedbacks 12
The benefits from overexploiting a resource are not always linear: they often diminish 13 as individuals try to compete more intensely for them. Diminishing returns can 14 therefore prevent a tragedy by reducing the overall benefit gained from increasingly 15 investing in a selfish behaviours [e.g. 8] . Diminishing returns are likely to be common 16 in a range of organisms, particularly when the individuals cannot make full use of the 17 extra resources that they acquire [8] . For example, the reproductive benefit of 18 possessing an ever-increasing territory is very likely diminishing: extremely large 19 territories prevent the individual from utilizing all its resources because other factors 20 become limiting (ultimately, speed of travel while foraging could prevent collecting 21 all resources). Thus, diminishing returns may put a break on overexploitation. 22
Diminishing returns may also resolve potential public good tragedies, as in the case of 23 blood sharing by vampire bats. Hungry bats need blood much more than ones that 24 have recently fed, and this diminishing benefit of the state of an individual can alter 1 the balance of reciprocal aid by diminishing the benefit gained by a cheater who will 2 not share with other individuals even when it has fed properly [8] . 3 Feedback between the size of the population (or group) and the intensity of conflict 4
[43, 44] is a related phenomenon that is also likely to be important in reducing the 5 intensity of conflicts. If conflict and competition have a negative impact on the 6 number of individuals in a population, then this will automatically change the number 7 of individuals there are to interact with, ultimately affecting the structure of the 8 "game" [43] . Thus, selective pressures differ between low densities and high 9 densities, creating a feedback between adaptive individual behaviour and population 10 density. The strength of this feedback could therefore have an influence on the 11 strength of the conflict itself, thereby preventing a collapsing tragedy [43] . A potential 12 example is quorum sensing in bacteriocin production [45] , where individual bacteria 13 reduce their production of bacteriocins when the population density is low. 14
What if the tragedy is not resolved? 15
Collapsing tragedies can be difficult to observe because they often destroy the study 16 object (the group or population, or the behavioural function that creates public goods). 17
However, this does not necessarily transfer the subject to evolutionary oblivion when 18 we consider that extinctions may have consequences for higher levels of selection, 19 such as group selection or species-level selection [14, 34, 46] . Recent work 20 demonstrates the potential for so-called evolutionary suicide [see 11]: precisely 21 because individual-level selection typically prevails over higher-level selection, 22 evolution is predicted to favour selfish individuals to the extent that it can lead to 23 extinction of higher-level biological structures. Cancer, a selfish form of cell growth 24
[47], can kill individual organisms. Similarly if individual-level conflict can cause 1 population extinction, collapsing tragedies may have a large effect on species 2 persistence: those overexploiting common goods are denied prolonged existence. This 3 may result in selection at the species level [11, 46, 48] . 4
Species-level selection can thus act as a "conflict limiting" mechanism if species that 5 have evolved high levels of conflict are driven extinct sooner than species in which 6 conflicts are milder [49] . Recent results suggest that even if actual evolutionary 7 suicide is not occurring, species with strong conflicts can render themselves 8 vulnerable to competitive exclusion, and thus competition with other species can 9 dramatically affect species persistence [e.g. 48, 50] . 10
If the tragedy of the commons can act as a selective force at the level of the species, 11
we would expect to observe traits which limit or resolve the tragedy. Perhaps the most challenging question lies in addressing the relative frequency at 6 which tragedies arise with or without mechanisms to prevent them from reaching total 7 collapses. Groups subject to a total collapse have a far shorter lifespan, which makes 8 them difficult to study. In the light of ever-growing environmental concerns, thinking 9 about the tragedy of the commons in evolutionary biology is of interest not only 10 because of these evolutionary implications, but also because of the applied analogy to 11 human societies dealing with environmental and other public goods problems (box 1). 12 
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